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1“ThaT I could look . . . on my own 
crucIfIxIon and bloody crownIng”: 
walT whITman’s anTI-gallows 
wrITIng and The appeal To  
chrIsTIan sympaThy 
Paul Christian Jones
Walt Whitman’s involvement in the anti-capital punishment move-
ment, primarily as a journalist in the 1840s, has never been properly 
understood by scholars of his work nor has it been recognized as hav-
ing significant relevance to understanding his later work, the poetry of 
Leaves of Grass. If acknowledged at all, it is often treated as a youthful 
phase, in which the twenty-something brooklyn newspaperman was 
caught up in the latest reform fad.1 In this essay, I argue that scholars 
have been mistaken to ignore whitman’s early commitment to anti-
gallows reform, as I explore his participation in the movement, tracing 
his efforts from his impassioned anti-gallows editorials for various peri-
odicals to his transference of these expressions into his verse.2 sharing 
michael moon’s assumption in Disseminating Whitman that whitman 
saw no distinction between his political and literary writing and “insisted 
on the interconnectedness of these realms,”3 this essay illustrates that 
an understanding of whitman’s strong political commitment to the 
abolition of the death penalty can inform our reading of the poetry in 
Leaves of Grass, especially in terms of his arguments for sympathy for 
condemned criminals and his use of the rhetoric of “christian sympa-
thy,” a rhetoric very common in antebellum anti-gallows arguments. 
This essay will demonstrate that a reader’s knowledge of whitman’s 
interest in this rhetoric can elucidate famous passages of whitman’s 
verse, including sections of “song of myself.”
whitman’s advocacy for the abolition of capital punishment began 
in his youth. as a 19-year-old member of the smithtown [new york] 
debating society, whitman argued in favor of abolition when the ques-
tion up for debate was “ought capital punishment to be abolished?”4 
when he became a professional journalist, the subject of the death 
penalty appeared frequently in his articles, sometimes merely in the 
form of reportage (the coverage of a trial or a hanging) but more often 
in the form of an editorial making a case for the necessity of ending 
2capital punishment. his journalistic career began when the discussion 
about abolishing the gallows was reaching its height in new york, as the 
Democratic Review waged its campaign against hanging, as state and local 
societies sprang up in support of the reform, and as anti-death penalty 
meetings, petitions, and pamphlets were ubiquitous.5 even though whit-
man was writing anti-gallows pieces for various publications, including 
the Democratic Review, it was when he assumed the editorial helm of the 
Brooklyn Daily Eagle in 1846 that he held his most influential role in the 
anti-gallows movement, publishing dozens of his own pieces advocat-
ing the abolition of hanging as well as those by like-minded writers. 
In his editorials, he referred readers to other anti-gallows publications, 
advocated a more active brooklyn society in support of abolition of the 
death penalty, and, in 1847, even scolded the Review for what he saw as 
its declining commitment to this issue. because of this activity, Thomas 
brasher, in his study of whitman’s editorship of the Eagle, characterizes 
whitman as being “by himself . . . a kind of society for the abolition 
of capital punishment” (brasher, 151). 
In a recollection of the movement, written for the Brooklyn Times 
in 1858, whitman fondly remembered his activism and pronounced 
the product of the movement as worthwhile. even though capital pun-
ishment had not been abolished, whitman asserted that reformers did 
achieve “an increased sensitiveness on the part of the public, toward 
any useless harshness in the treatment of criminals” and “diffus[ed] 
more benevolence and sympathy through the public mind, elevating the 
range of temper and feeling, and reacting in a hundred different modes, 
indirectly upon the popular taste, and upon criminal law, the doings 
of courts and Juries, and the management of prisons.”6 In the effects 
whitman describes, “increased sensitiveness” and “more benevolence 
and sympathy through the public mind,” we find his articulation of 
the intended aim of all of his anti-gallows writing, from the earliest 
journalism of the 1840s to the mature poems of Leaves of Grass, where 
whitman continued to challenge the gallows and work to produce 
sensitivity and understanding on the part of the reading public towards 
society’s criminals; in all this work he argues for a sympathetic response 
that would lead his readers to oppose the death penalty as ineffective, 
inhumane, and immoral.
Whitman’s Anti-Gallows Journalism and the Appeal to Sympathy
for whitman, a newspaper had a purpose larger than merely 
informing its readership of current events. In an 1846 editorial, he 
explained, “much good can always be done, with such potent influ-
ence as a well circulated newspaper. To wield that influence is a great 
3responsibility. There are numerous noble reforms that have yet to 
be pressed upon the world. people are to be schooled, in opposition 
perhaps to their long established ways of thought.”7 Thus, whitman 
considered journalism, at its best, to be a form of progressive activism, 
and the abolition of capital punishment was one of the foremost of the 
“noble reforms” that he pursued in this “schooling” of his newspaper 
readership of the 1840s.
his earliest known newspaper pieces on the subject appeared in 
november 1842, the period when the infamous murderer John c. colt 
was awaiting execution. his editorials of this time echo much of the 
rhetoric against the gallows appearing in the Democratic Review and 
other anti-gallows publications. The first article, “capital punish-
ment and social responsibility,” sought to persuade its readers that 
all members of society are “directly responsible for wrong, oppressive, 
inhuman, cruel and tyrannical laws.” after failed attempts to abolish 
capital punishment in the new york state legislature in 1841 and 1842, 
whitman believed that society had “lull[ed] the sensitive conscience 
into a delusive slumber” from which he wanted to awaken his readers, 
to show them the influence they could exert on their legislators and 
thus on the continued use of hanging. like other anti-gallows activists, 
whitman directed his strongest criticism at the clergy, who were often 
the death penalty’s strongest supporters or at least complicit, according 
to whitman, for their failure to denounce the practice:
why is the pulpit silent on this all-absorbing topic? while judicial murder is executed 
on a human soul, why do the clergy seem idle accessories and indifferent spectators? do 
they feel no moral responsibility moving upon their consciences to exhort a reformation 
in their cruel superstition? . . . [T]his tacit consent is . . . an unpardonable neglect 
of duty. one would think their anxiety for their holy cause, and an overruling desire 
to prove to the world, that the Redeemer had not died in vain to soften that depravity 
of the human heart of which they preach, would be sufficient stimulus to impel them 
to the work. (Journ, 1:160-161)
In this, his earliest known piece against capital punishment, whitman 
already implies what will grow to be a major point in his argument 
against capital punishement: that the practice of the death penalty 
is antithetical to christianity and that the clergy, who either were its 
supporters or who chose not to preach against it, were failing in their 
christian mission. 
over the course of the 1840s, whitman returned to the subject 
of the gallows in dozens of pieces, most of them written for the Eagle 
when he was crime reporter as well as editor from 1846 to 1848. crime 
reporting in the 1840s, as david papke has argued, was becoming 
increasingly politicized.8 for example, papke explains that journalists 
4might use their descriptions of criminal proceedings to defend the 
working class who were frequently mistreated by the justice system or 
to condemn the police and courts when they were easily manipulated 
by the wealthy and powerful. as we have seen in the piece discussed 
above, whitman’s crime reporting was likewise politicized, as he con-
sistently used his coverage of crime to present the by-then standard 
arguments against the death penalty circulating in the 1840s. These 
arguments included that there was the possibility of convicting and 
executing innocent people; that capital punishment did not serve as a 
deterrent; that the spectacle of hanging actually encouraged dangerous 
and criminal behavior in the populace, including homicide, domestic 
and animal abuse, and suicide; that teaching the preciousness of life by 
executing someone seemed counterintuitive; and that juries had begun 
to refuse to convict criminals, out of fear that they would be sentenced 
to death, and thus, actual guilty people were going unpunished and set 
free because of the existence of the death penalty.9
despite the various logical arguments that whitman makes against 
hanging, the dominant appeal that whitman makes in these writings is 
an emotional rather than a rational one. That is, he often asks his readers 
to feel for the criminals he is writing about, to identify sympathetically 
with them, and to imagine themselves in the place of these criminals. 
his embrace of this approach in his journalism anticipates those famous 
sympathetic proclamations of his poetry, such as his persona’s descrip-
tion of himself in “song of myself” as “I am he attesting sympathy” 
(LGVar., 1:28) and his assertion that “I do not ask the wounded person 
how he feels, I myself become the wounded person” (52).10 for example, 
in one piece where he advocates life imprisonment rather than execu-
tion for convicts, he observes: “looking only at the criminal in con-
nection with the great outrage through which we know him, we forget 
that he is still a duplicate of the humanity that stays in us all. he may 
be seared in vice, but if we could stand invisible by him in prison and 
look into his soul, how often during those terrible nights might we not 
see agony compared to which the pains of the slain are but a passing 
sigh!” (Journ, 1:302). This acknowledgement of the humanity of the 
criminal, the awareness of his pain, and the move toward a sympathetic 
understanding of his plight are striking aspects of whitman’s writing 
about specific criminals as well. for example, in his commentary on 
the execution of henry wyatt, a convicted murderer in auburn, new 
york, he portrays wyatt as “a most abandoned young man” and asks 
the reader to “contemplate his nature—his furious physical passions, 
his early ignorance, depraved companionship, want of pure example, 
and the fatal fostering of the first seeds of sin in his breast till the roots 
became knit in his very life” (Journ, 2:56). 
5perhaps the best illustration of how whitman’s sympathetic ap-
proach differed from the more typical journalistic handling can be 
seen through a comparison of his writing about a specific case, that 
of confessed murderer william freeman, with the coverage provided 
by other contemporary reporters. whitman discussed freeman in the 
sarcastically titled 1846 piece, “hurrah for hanging!,” written after 
freeman, an african-american man, was convicted for the murder of 
five members of a family in rural new york. while the article begins by 
calling freeman a “monster” and “the butcher of five human beings” 
and acknowledging the public appetite for his execution, whitman asks 
his reader to consider the circumstances of this “neglected, ignorant 
and depraved negro” and “uneducated, friendless outcast,” who “has 
never had the benefit of any kind of teaching or counsel; and never lived 
within any fixed moral or religious influences.” whitman asserts that 
freeman’s “whole character is of the most blindly brutal cast—a mere 
human animal.” he then describes freeman being convicted of horse-
theft at age nineteen (“a crime of which he says he is not guilty”) and 
being incarcerated in prison for five years, where “the idea of revenge 
[against the man who wrongly accused him] seems to have swallowed 
up all things else” and he became “blinded by his purpose of blood.” 
once released, he “not only strikes the object of his spite, the man who 
did him the supposed wrong, but . . . [also] plunges his knife into all 
whom he meets, sacrificing guilty and innocent alike.” whitman argues 
that the “very horror of the butchery” shows “how thoroughly diseased 
and confused the whole moral being of the murderer had become” 
(Journ, 1:300-301). whitman’s response can ultimately be classed as 
sentimental, consistent with this approach’s tendency, as philip fisher 
describes it, to experiment “with the extension of full and complete 
humanity to classes of figures from whom it has been socially with-
held.” fisher notes that “the typical objects of sentimental compassion 
are the prisoner, the madman, the child, the very old, the animal, and 
the slave.”11 
“hurrah for hanging!” displays a plea for understanding of this 
mass murderer that is not seen in other contemporary coverage of 
freeman’s crime. for example, the National Police Gazette’s coverage 
is devoid of compassion or understanding, noting that it “is difficult 
to attribute any sufficient motive to the monster for the commission of 
the deed.” calling freeman a “wretch” and an “assassin,” the Gazette 
narrates in gruesome detail the killing of each victim, including the 
child of “but two years old” who became the “object of his hellish ven-
geance.”12 In another piece on freeman, the Gazette posits a potential 
motive, noting that a cousin of freeman was also convicted for murder 
six years before: “there must be some bad blood running in the veins of 
6the freeman tribe. It is stated that wm. freeman is one-quarter Indian, 
his mother having been one-half Indian.”13 however, this possibility of 
“bad blood” is not used by the Gazette to excuse the crime, but instead 
serves to make him only more alien and monstrous, rather than poten-
tially sympathetic. similarly, the account in the Harbinger eventually 
reaches a crescendo of gory melodrama: “upon the floors—upon the 
snow—upon the steps—the doors—every where—blood, blood marked 
the murderer’s tracks. what a night of horror was that.” even though the 
correspondent notes details similar to those whitman relates, including 
the wrongful imprisonment, and claims to be “strongly opposed . . . to 
capital punishment,” he argues nonetheless that “there cannot be 
the slightest sympathy for the culprit; a more cold-blooded, villainous 
butchery was probably never committed in this or any other age or 
country.”14 so while this piece acknowledges that the justice system 
has failed freeman, it does not make the leap that whitman makes: to 
assert that the primary responsibility for his horrendous crime should 
be placed not on the criminal himself but rather on the society that 
had brutalized him and the flawed justice system that had failed him.
whitman understood that his appeal to sympathy for criminals, 
like wyatt and freeman, opened him up to criticism. he predicted 
in the wyatt piece that the defenders of the gallows, whom he calls 
“conservator[s] of ‘justice,’” would condemn his characterization as 
“the fruit of ‘mawkish sympathy,’” and will find it “horrible and blas-
phemous, and dangerous to the land, to utter one word of sympathy 
and pity for him whom society has thrust out” (Journ, 2:56). he knew 
that his handling of these cases placed him directly in the midst of the 
arguments about sympathy being waged in these years between de-
fenders of the gallows and those advocating its abolition. as one would 
expect, writers defending the gallows, many of them congregationalist 
and presbyterian ministers, ridiculed the abolitionists’ concern for the 
criminal as misguided and foolish. for example, congregationalist 
minister leonard bacon agreed that citizens should have “a natural 
and reasonable sympathy” for the condemned, but cautioned against 
letting it go further: “If, in our sympathy, we forget the crime for which 
that suffering is inflicted—if, in our sympathy, we cry out against the 
wickedness of society in putting the poor fellow into prison and treating 
him so badly—our sympathy has grown excessive, unreasonable, mor-
bid.”15 other ministers echoed these sentiments, like congregationalist 
Joseph Thompson, who described compassion for the condemned as 
“weak sympathy for a guilty man.”16 The most famously outspoken of 
the defenders of the gallows, new york presbyterian minister george 
b. cheever, described this feeling as the “false sentimentality and 
compassion that lead men to exercise a deeper sympathy with the mur-
derer . . . than with the murdered man.”17 
7The voices of abolition, often ministers themselves, mounted a 
vigorous defense of their pleas for sympathy for the condemned. univer-
salist minister william barber argued that society has an obligation to 
its criminals because “the murderer is a man who is morally diseased” 
and “we are as much bound to support him, as we are to support the 
sick and aged.”18 universalist minister e. h. chapin rejected the notion, 
asserted by the conservatives, that this sympathy is a “morbid feeling” 
and went even further to argue that this feeling is actually the key ele-
ment to all social progress: 
Morbid feeling! This has always been the cry. It was a morbid feeling in those who pro-
tested for the rights of individual conscience—it was a morbid feeling in our puritan 
fathers that excited them to resist the tyranny of the church. . . . It was a morbid 
feeling that introduced the patriots of the revolution to rebel. It was a morbid feeling 
that softened down the harsh penalties of cutting out the heart, of transfixing the head 
on a pole and of stretching on a rack, to hanging on a gibbet. . . . and I expect that 
this morbid feeling will continue until the ermine of Justice shall be no longer stained 
with blood, until men learn to be merciful even while they punish, until they learn 
that the true policy of society is not severity but reformation. If all this—and it is all 
of a kind—is morbid feeling, let it work on. To me it looks like that energy tempered 
by reason and guided by christianity that has led to all the beneficial and glorious 
reforms that have heretofore been accomplished.19
like chapin, other writers concurred that this sympathy was an es-
sential part of christianity. for example, universalist minister samuel 
brimblecom argued that what is called “mawkish sensibility” is really 
“‘christ within’ that condemned the practice of killing.”20 In his attack 
on capital punishment, the universalist minister g. w. Quinby asserts 
that critics who call sympathy for criminals morbid “might as well 
charge chrIsT hImself with cherishing a ‘morbid sympathy.’”21 
Indeed, these anti-gallows activists often held up christ as the 
model of how christians should feel towards criminals and toward the 
practice of capital punishment. for example, an essay, signed J. m. m., 
urged this attitude toward the condemned: 
feel for him, then, as christ would feel,—with an intense compassion. restrain not 
your sympathies. deal faithfully with his sins, condemn and avoid them; but cherish 
towards him no other emotions than pity for his misfortunes and sorrow for his guilt. 
pray for his reformation. encourage the faintest hope of recovery; and remember that 
if by your instrumentality a soul is saved from death, it will forever be your joy and 
crown of rejoicing. how often have we witnessed the beneficent influence of such a 
course of conduct towards the erring! . . . how many have been thrown back even 
into still worse habits of sin for want of christian sympathy, counsel and assistance.22 
8Though his unorthodox religious views are not usually considered to be 
traditionally christian, whitman does explicitly embrace, in his jour-
nalism about capital punishment, this connection between christianity 
and sympathy advocated by these reformers.23  In an 1846 editorial, for 
example, he challenged those “who see in all feeling for the wicked a 
‘mawkish sympathy’” by asking, “who are we to pity . . . if not those 
most pitiable of all our fellow creatures—the doers of great crimes?” 
he argues that “christ’s ministry was for them” and implores readers 
to “forget not that the same god who made us, made them—and that 
his sunshine and blessings come alike to them as to us. If it be ‘mawkish 
sympathy’ to think so, then was the great expiator of sin the weakest 
and wildest visionary of us all!” (Journ, 1:258). In another response to 
the charge of “mawkish sympathy,” whitman points out that it is “quite 
fashionable, among a certain set of men, to denounce and turn up their 
noses at those who, following the spirit of christ, would ‘overcome evil 
with good,’ and give not way to wrath and revenge.” yet, he notes that 
“some of this set of men get up of sundays in the pulpit and hold forth 
as the accredited ministers of him who was without guile,” an act that 
he labels “shameless perversion!” (Journ, 2:44).24  In an 1847 article, 
he answers the charges that sympathy for executed criminals is mere 
“‘sentimentality’—a foolish weakness, only fit for women and children,” 
by contending that “nearly all that is good and pure in the world—in law, 
government, human action, and other departments of life—proceeds 
from the impulses of this ‘sentimentality,’” which he attributes to “the 
divine emanation of chrIsT’s purity and gentleness” (Journ, 2:289). 
In these pieces then, readers can see that whitman aligned himself with 
those antagonists of capital punishment who argued that sympathy was 
a necessary quality of being christian. whitman not only advocated 
such sympathy but displayed it in his anti-gallows journalism. 
as whitman encourages his newspaper audience to sympathize 
with the condemned, he implies that the same society and justice system 
that have failed the individuals in the headlines could just as easily fail 
any of his readers. consequently, he does not hesitate to suggest that any 
human being could find him or herself, under the right circumstances, 
in the place of these murderers facing the gallows. In this move both to 
make his readers feel for the condemned and also to, in a sense, become 
the condemned (or at least to begin to equate the criminal with them-
selves), we see the work of the project of sympathetic identification. as 
glenn hendler explains, “To feel compassion, as opposed to mere pity, 
one must be able to imagine oneself, at least to some extent, in another’s 
position.” hendler quotes adam smith’s discussion of sympathy in The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments to justify his claim: “by the imagination we 
place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the 
9same torments, we enter as it were into his body and become in some 
measure the same person with him.”25 sharing this understanding of 
sympathetic identification, whitman equates himself and his reader 
with the criminals under discussion in his journalism. for example, in 
his coverage of the colt case, he explains the lesson that his audience 
should draw from the tragic events: 
That lesson teaches how frail and weak is poor human nature—how little we know 
ourselves—what strangers we are to our own evil propensities—how much we need 
the support of high, stern, and rock-founded moral principle—and how terrible and 
uncontrollable is the wild tempest of human passions when once they obtain the 
mastery over the reason and the conscience. (Journ, 1:162)
he asks his reader to reflect upon whether they would have been able 
to act differently than colt: “do we know ourselves any better than he 
knew himself? do we comprehend, and have we the fixed moral prin-
ciple, the high moral energy to control, the fearful volcano of human 
passions, whose maddened fires roar and blaze within our bosoms?” 
(Journ, 1:163). 
In his commentaries on these crimes, whitman almost always 
serves as the mediator between his readers and these objects of sym-
pathy, including wyatt and freeman; readers always hear his voice as 
he tries to reproduce within them his compassion for the condemned. 
however, he does allow one of these convicts to speak for himself in 
“a dialogue,” an 1845 piece published in the Democratic Review. This 
piece strays from being attached to the reporting of a contemporary 
crime and instead introduces a “fanciful dialogue” between society 
and a condemned criminal, to present almost every argument that 
could be garnered against the death penalty at the time. while all of 
the familiar anti-gallows arguments appear in “a dialogue,” whitman 
devotes most of the piece to the convict’s argument with members of 
society, one that asserts that they do not hold the moral high ground 
nor are they different from the criminal himself. as the convict pro-
ceeds through his dialogue, whitman shifts his readers’ sympathies. as 
readers begin this essay, they most naturally would view themselves as 
aligned with members of society (for that is what they are) rather than 
with this criminal (because they see no connection to this demonized 
figure). however, this alignment, as we shall see, does not hold up as 
the convict points a finger at society and the reader eventually joins him 
in the finger-pointing. upon society’s insistence that “we shall strangle 
you; your crime deserves it,” the convict, a condemned murderer, asks 
them, “have you, then, committed no crimes?” (Journ, 1:205), direct-
ing both the society within the dialogue and its readers to examine 
themselves. The convict suggests that some of these individuals who 
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make up society (and the readership as well) are guilty of crimes equal 
to, if not greater than, his own. his crime is that he struck a neighbor 
with a “heavy blow” when a “frenzy came over” him due to the “great 
passions” making up his “physical temperament.” The voices of society 
admit that one of them had a mother who pined away and died because 
of his intemperance; another is a landlord who evicted a poor family 
from his building, leading to the death of two children; and yet another 
admits to having “effected the ruin of a young girl,” who later drowned 
herself. society concludes this confession of its crimes by asserting that 
“we are all frail!,” an admission that causes the convict to plead with 
them “to sympathise with me—to let me not be hung” (206). ulti-
mately, this dialogue attempts to school its audience in a sympathetic 
response, as it manipulates the reader into identifying with the convict, 
modeling itself after adam smith’s depiction of the sympathetic process 
as whitman (and perhaps the reader) has entered into the body of the 
convict and “become in some measure the same person with him.” The 
dialogue also anticipates whitman’s poetics, which, according to karen 
sánchez-eppler, is “a poetics of merger” wherein the poet attempts to 
resolve differences with a “rhetoric of amalgamation.”26 This text then 
demonstrates the desired outcome of whitman’s project for his readers 
and encourages them to identify with, even “become,” the convict who 
speaks so persuasively with whitman’s voice. 
highlighting the consequence of failing to practice this sympathy, 
whitman casts his dialogue as a debate between an individual (“I”) and 
society (“we”); all the voices other than the convict are combined into a 
corporate identity. while this “society” is made up of individuals, they 
do not think of themselves as such, nor do they even consider or argue 
from their own individual interests; instead they only voice the state’s 
policies. In fact, because they cannot conceive of themselves as this 
convict or imagine themselves in his place, whitman suggests they are 
able to condone violence against an individual that would otherwise be 
reprehensible. when the criminal claims that the very act of demanding 
his death (as “revenge” for the harm he has caused society) is as much 
of a crime as his own deed was, society differentiates between his acts 
and those of the state: “‘The case is different,’ rejoins society. ‘we are 
a community—you are but a single individual’” (Journ, 1:206). The 
dialogue points out the irony that “that which is barbarous, false, or 
selfish for an individual becomes singularly proper when sanctioned by 
the legislature, or a supposed national policy” and that “deeds wicked 
in a man are thus applauded in a number of men” (208). whitman 
here posits that if murder is an “awful crime” because it “invades the 
prerogative of god, for god’s is the only power that can give life—and 
offers a horrid copy for the rest of mankind,” then the “very facts which 
render murder a frightful crime, render hanging a frightful punishment” 
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(208). he suggests that society’s crime might even be worse than the 
convict’s own since it is carried out with intention and forethought, 
unlike his own which was the act of passion.
In addition to attacking the defense of hanging as the privilege 
of the state, whitman concludes by attacking the cloak of religion 
that is used to justify the death penalty. he characterizes the “found-
ing . . . of the hanging system . . . on holy scriptures” as “a bold, 
impudent effrontery” and “a prostitution so foul of names and influences 
so awfully sacred” (Journ, 1:208). he lists a number of “barbarous 
cruelties and martyrdoms inflicted in the name of god and his sacred 
word” (committed by the likes of calvin, henry VIII, edward VI, and 
“bloody mary”) and compares these historic atrocities to the current 
environment in which “clergymen call for sanguinary punishments in 
the name of the gospel,—when, chased from point to point of human 
policy, they throw themselves on the supposed necessity of hanging in 
order to gratify and satisfy heaven—when, instead of christian mildness 
and love, they demand that our laws shall be pervaded by vindictiveness 
and violence.” whitman describes his soul as “filled with amazement, 
indignation and horror, utterly uncontrollable” at this perversion of 
religion and wonders if the church’s support for the gallows does not 
provide an obstacle to its christian mission: 
when I go by a church, I cannot help thinking whether its walls do not sometimes 
echo, “strangle and kill in the name of god!” The grasp of a minister’s hand, pro-
duces a kind of choking sensation; and by some optical fascination, the pulpit is often 
intercepted from my view by a ghastly gallows frame. . . . “o, bible!” say I, “what 
follies and monstrous barbarities are defended in thy name!” (209)
This brief survey of whitman’s journalistic writing about the 
gallows shows him to be actively involved, as a writer, in this reform 
movement, following his notion that journalism should “press upon 
the world” such “noble reforms,” through a process that he referred to 
as “schooling” his reader “in opposition . . . to their long established 
ways of thought” (Journ, 1:392). one of the key elements in his educa-
tion of the reader is teaching them to sympathize with the condemned, 
a process that attempts to create, as kristin boudreau explains, “a sym-
pathetic identification” that would “replace difference with similarity” 
and allow the readers to “imagin[e] not what the spectacle must feel, but 
what the spectator himself would feel in the spectacle’s place.”27 as we 
see in “a dialogue,” whitman also wants to remove social and cultural 
barriers that prevent the production of this sympathetic identification. 
as the ending of this essay makes clear, he viewed the church’s sup-
port for the death penalty to be one such barrier. his employment of 
the rhetoric of “christian sympathy” is one of the ways he attempted 
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to overcome this barrier, by arguing that, despite what the clergy might 
argue, sympathy for the condemned was not a sentimental weakness 
but a christian imperative. 
“I am he attesting sympathy”: Whitman’s Poetics of Sympathy and the 
Case against Capital Punishment in Leaves of Grass
whitman’s campaign against capital punishment was not confined 
to his prose. Indeed, one of his earliest poems, “resurgemus” (published 
in 1850, later revised as “europe, the 72d and 73d years of These states” 
for inclusion in Leaves of Grass), echoes much of the anti-gallows rhetoric 
of the 1840s in which capital punishment was viewed as anti-democratic, 
a tool used by oppressive states to maintain control over their subjects. 
another early poem, “song of the broad-axe,” also makes the argument 
that capital punishment has no place in a democratic society. as whit-
man imagines america moving in the direction of becoming a “great 
city,” he contrasts the american productive use of the axe with its less 
progressive employment in europe by raising the issue of capital pun-
ishment in section 8. The “european headsman,” who “stands mask’d, 
clothed in red, with huge legs and strong naked arms,” leaning upon 
“a ponderous axe,” becomes the representative of old world tyranny, 
which uses this axe as a tool of oppression and reactionary response to 
progress (LGVar., 1:184). section 8 ends with whitman’s prediction 
that this use of the axe will eventually run its course: 
I see the blood wash’d entirely away from the axe,
both blade and helve are clean,
They spirt no more the blood of european nobles, they clasp no more the necks of 
queens.
I see the headsman withdraw and become useless,
I see the scaffold untrodden and mouldy, I see no longer any axe upon it, 
I see the mighty and friendly emblem of the power of my own race, the newest, 
largest race. (185)
The use of the axe to kill criminals, he argues, is an obsolete remnant 
of old world ways and certainly not part of the “great city” that he 
imagines. yet, he acknowledges, in section 10, that a version of this 
“headsman” does exist in america in the gallows, when he describes 
“the step-ladder for the convicted and sentenced murderer, the mur-
derer with haggard face and pinion’d arms, / The sheriff at hand with 
his deputies, the silent and white-lipp’d crowd, the dangling of the 
rope” (187). Thus, america’s full potential cannot be realized as long 
as capital punishment remains as a residual element of a past form of 
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society, one that is tyrannical, afraid of progress, and unwilling to trust 
people to self-government. 
figures suffering the punishment of society, whether they are 
specifically referred to as murderers, felons, prisoners, or convicts, 
populate whitman’s poetry as he paints his all-encompassing portrait 
of america. often, whitman merely introduces these figures into his 
panoramic catalogues, alongside much more appealing characters, 
without any further comment or implicit argument against the gallows. 
for example, in section 16 of “song of myself,” which functions as an 
elaboration of the previous section’s description of all the varied things 
that, whitman’s persona asserts, “more or less I am” (LGVar., 1:20), he 
concludes with this list: “a farmer, mechanic, artist, gentleman, sailor, 
quaker, / prisoner, fancy-man, rowdy, lawyer, physician, priest” (21). 
while this type of insertion of convicted murderers and other criminals 
into Leaves of Grass serves as a strategy to provide an accurate picture 
of american life, other passages more explicitly attempt to humanize 
these figures and illustrate to readers that these criminals are essentially 
no different from themselves. for example, in “salut au monde!,” as 
the speaker expansively salutes everything he sees in the world, he in-
cludes “prisoners in the prisons, / . . . The pirates, thieves, betrayers, 
murderers,” and the speaker concludes by saying, “I go among them, 
I mix indiscriminately, / and I salute all the inhabitants of the earth” 
(LGVar., 1:172). The end of the next section of the poem strongly makes 
his point of equality among all: “each of us [is] here as divinely as any 
is here” (174). This moment moves beyond an acknowledgement of the 
existence of murderers toward a more provocative argument asserting 
these murderers’ equality to all other human beings.
other poems continue whitman’s schooling of his audience in this 
lesson of leveling, finding more novel ways to equate the readers with 
figures to whom they might assume they are superior. “song of the 
open road” uses the open road’s acceptance of all human beings as a 
way to bring together the extremes of society, as it accepts “the felon, 
the diseas’d, the illiterate person” alongside more socially respectable 
figures, like the physician and the “laughing party of mechanics,” as 
welcome on the road: “They pass, I also pass, any thing passes, none 
can be interdicted, / none but are accepted, none but shall be dear to 
me” (LGVar., 1:226-227). and, in “The sleepers,” whitman makes a 
similar inclusion as he considers all the people on earth as they sleep, 
pondering “[t]he murderer that is to be hung next day” and asking, 
“how does he sleep?” (110). In the poem, he also includes other similar 
figures: “[t]he criminal that stood in the box, the judge that sat and 
sentenced him, the fluent lawyers, the jury, the audience” (118). and 
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he makes his equalizing agenda explicit as he notes: “I swear they [all 
the sleepers from every quarter of society] are averaged now—one is 
no better than the other, / The night and sleep have liken’d them and 
restored them. // I swear they are all beautiful” (118). 
like his journalism, his poetry eventually moved to produce sym-
pathy in his readers for these criminals and condemned men, to get 
the readers to acknowledge the essential humanity that they share with 
these figures, and it sometimes turned to sentimentalism as a means of 
doing this. for example, “The singer in the prison,” a poem inspired by 
a famous singer’s performance for inmates in sing sing prison, evokes 
sympathy for the prisoners by depicting their emotional response to 
the singer’s moving hymn. The poem’s singer, described only as “a 
lady” holding “a little innocent child by either hand,” enters the room, 
crowded with hundreds of “sear-faced murderers,” “thieves and outlaws 
of the land” who are gathered for “sunday church in prison walls” and 
performs a “quaint old hymn” that is itself an expression of sympathy 
for their situation, as she imagines the pain of imprisoned souls:
a soul confined by bars and bands,
cries, help! o help! and wrings her hands,
blinded her eyes, bleeding her breast,
nor pardon finds, nor balm of rest.
ceaseless she paces to and fro,
o heart-sick days! o nights of woe!
nor hand of friend, nor loving face.
nor favor comes, nor word of grace.
It was not I that sinn’d the sin,
The ruthless body dragg’d me in; 
Though long I strove courageously, 
The body was too much for me. 
dear prison’d soul bear up a space,
for soon or late the certain grace; 
To set thee free and bear thee home,
The heavenly pardoner death shall come. (LGVar., 3:598)
her sympathetic address to the prisoners expresses an understanding 
of their circumstances—their “heart-sick days” and “nights of woe” 
without the encouraging “hand of friend” or “loving face”—and even 
places herself in their situation in a sense (the soul is a “she,” and by 
the third stanza of the hymn she uses the pronouns “I” and “me” to 
discuss the soul’s struggle against its “ruthless body”). after she asserts 
that death will be the “heavenly pardoner” that will free the soul from 
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its prison, she ends the song with these two lines: “Convict no more, nor 
shame, nor dole! / Depart—a God-enfranchis’d soul!” (599), suggesting 
that god would see these men not as convicts but as souls.
The third section of the poem describes the effect of the singer’s 
performance on the prisoners. as one would expect, given the senti-
mentality of the poem, their response is a tearful one: “while upon 
all, convicts and armed keepers ere they stirr’d, / (convict forgetting 
prison, keeper his loaded pistol,) / a hush and pause fell down a won-
drous minute, / with deep, half-stifled sobs and sound of bad men 
bow’d and moved to weeping” (LGVar., 3:599). The poem depicts 
within these lines the ultimate goal of whitman’s larger poetic project. 
The song’s effect is felt by the convicts and their keepers, as both forget 
the elements that differentiate them. The vague word choice of line 44 
as it describes “bad men” weeping, intriguingly could apply to both 
groups of men, especially if we accept the implication of the hymn that 
we all are slaves to our “ruthless” bodies. The tears are linked to the 
men’s memories: “memories of home, / The mother’s voice in lullaby, 
the sister’s care, the happy childhood, / The long-pent spirit rous’d 
to reminiscence” (599). while the song and perhaps the maternal 
presence of its singer have this effect upon the men inside the poem, 
“The singer in the prison” is intended, of course, to affect the reader 
who perhaps needs to be reminded of the humanity of these “bad 
men,” reminded that these murderers and thieves, like prison guards 
and the readers themselves, have mothers and sisters, that they were 
once children, and that they, too, feel. most significantly, whitman 
would want to impart to his readers, who probably see these men as a 
“[s]trange sea of prison faces,” that they should see them instead as 
souls not very different from themselves.
whitman intended his readers to put themselves into the place 
of these men and to imagine that they themselves could have come to 
similar ends if circumstances had been different. This project of level-
ing his readers with these social “inferiors” is made explicit in poems 
where whitman’s persona models this sympathetic identification with 
the criminal for his readers and asserts that the difference in circum-
stances between oneself and others is quite arbitrary. for example, in 
“you felons on Trial in courts,” the speaker addresses the criminals 
of the world, including “convicts in prison-cells” and “sentenced as-
sassins chain’d and handcuff’d with iron” and informs them that there 
is no reason that he is not being punished as they are, for he is just as 
“ruthless and devilish as any” (LGVar., 2:325). The 1860 version of 
the poem begins with an eight-line confession omitted from subsequent 
editions of Leaves, in which the persona announces, “I own that I have 
been sly, thievish, mean, a prevaricator, greedy, derelict, // and I own 
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that I remain so yet” (325n).28 he continues to confess, “what foul 
thought but I think it—or have in me the stuff out of which it is thought? 
/ what in darkness in bed at night, alone or with a companion?” (325n). 
he acknowledges that the same elements that society condemns in the 
felons lurk unseen beneath the surface in himself. Though this specific 
confession disappears from subsequent versions, what remains is the 
implied guilt—a shared character trait between whitman’s speaker and 
the criminal element he addresses. because he asserts that there is no 
difference in his own character and that of the criminal, he asks the 
felons, “who am I too that I am not on trial or in prison? / . . . that 
my wrists are not chain’d with iron, or my ankles with iron?” (325). 
The first half of the poem insists that he is an equal to these figures 
whom society would deem his inferiors.
The second half of the poem turns from addressing the titular felons 
and instead addresses his reader, with this exclamation: “o culpable! 
I acknowledge—I exposé!” (LGVar., 2:325). The persona reveals the 
“foul thoughts” within: “Inside these breast-bones I lie smutch’d and 
choked, / beneath this face that appears so impassive hell’s tides continu-
ally run, / lusts and wickedness are acceptable to me” (326). because 
of this recognition of his own nature, he is able to embrace society’s 
outcasts: “I walk with delinquents with passionate love” because “I 
feel I am of them—I belong to those convicts and prostitutes myself” 
(326). The product of this understanding of his own character and the 
equation of himself with the convicts is an ability to sympathize with 
them and to “walk with” them, a process that leads to an acknowledge-
ment of obligation to them: “henceforth I will not deny them—for how 
can I deny myself?” (326). notably, in this poem in which the persona 
ends with an assertion of a merging between “them” and “myself,” a 
quite different dynamic than that portrayed in “a dialogue,” whitman 
manages a clever, yet subtle, merging of his audience with the felons, 
shifting the “you” who is being addressed from the felons of the first 
six lines to his readers in the remainder of the poem, and, thus, “you” 
becomes a merged entity. This poem, like the song sung to the prisoners 
in “The singer in the prison,” is addressed to social extremes with the 
purpose of uniting them in their common humanity, here exemplified 
in a shared sinful nature. 
recent literary scholars of nineteenth-century uses of sentimental-
ism and sympathy, like marianne noble, elizabeth barnes, and kristin 
boudreau, to name only a few, have been, according to glenn hendler, 
less interested in sympathy’s “potential to build bridges between people” 
than “its colonizing proclivity to collapse them” (hendler, 8). even 
though whitman explicitly employs sympathy to illustrate a common 
humanity between very different people, twentieth-century studies of 
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whitman’s use of sympathetic identification have been more interested 
in the problematic consequences of such identification. These critics 
have examined the interaction between the poet and the objects of his 
sympathy, questioning both its motivations and its effectiveness. for 
example, although denis donoghue grants that whitman’s poetry can 
be read “as a hymn to the sympathetic imagination,” he skeptically cau-
tions that “it is one thing to suffer, and it is another thing to sympathize 
with the suffering of others, and these experiences are not identical, 
no matter what whitman’s equation says.”29 numerous critics propose 
that the ends of whitman’s sympathy appear more self-interested than 
selfless. for instance, stephen black argues that whitman’s verse was 
more concerned with himself than the figures receiving his sympathy. 
addressing the section of “song of myself” in which whitman’s speaker 
asserts, “I am the hounded slave” (LGVar., 1:51), black claims that 
“the poet is more preoccupied with his own sympathies than with the 
slave . . . [, who] exists only as an idea by which the poet measures his 
humanity.”30 Indeed, it has been whitman’s sympathetic handling of 
slave figures specifically that has proven the most controversial aspect 
in recent scholarship. for example, in kristin boudreau’s examination 
of “whitman’s voracious sympathy for the slave,” she wonders “what 
might become of the slave subjected to an unchecked sympathetic em-
brace” and posits that the consequence of whitman’s effort “to ‘enter 
into’ another is not to understand that other’s feelings but to ensure 
that one’s own be projected there” (boudreau, 84-85). 
while there is merit to what these critics say, it is useful here to 
remind ourselves how very different the terms and the central concerns 
of this scholarly discussion of sympathy are from those appearing in 
the debates about sympathy in the 1840s and 50s. at that time, as we 
have seen already, the arguments are about who is a deserving object of 
sympathy and the consequences of that sympathy being misdirected or 
withheld. as noted earlier, many proponents of sympathy couched their 
arguments in terms of it being a christian obligation, suggesting that 
“christian sympathy” could be both an alternative to capital punish-
ment, as it would lead criminals to rehabilitation, but also a means to 
its abolition (that is, if people sincerely held this sympathy for criminals, 
they would never consent to executions). The most idealistic of these 
advocates, like universalist minister e. h. chapin, suggest that all so-
cial progress depended upon this practice. chapin specifically asserts, 
“the great law of love, of Christian sympathy, must reign in your heart 
and mine, and then fraud and oppression and all sin will die for the 
face of the earth. all false institutions will crumble, having no support. 
and humanity will rise and shine in the splendor of a new day, and the 
beauty of a new power.” he exhorted his readers: 
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let us, then, each in our sphere, go forth to cherish christian sympathy, to feel a 
brother’s wrongs as our own, to be as jealous of his rights as if ours were in peril. not 
in wide results and in broad fields shall the work of human melioration be accom-
plished at first. but at our own doors, there may be sick, hungry, naked or in prison; 
some poor brother or sister may lie, needing some kindly word or friendly deed. how 
richly hath god blessed us with opportunities of imitating him! a visit, a word, a 
smile, sometimes open a fountain of gladness in some worn and wasted heart, that 
will gush long years after, mingling with prayers for us. Thus, by cherishing the spirit 
of christian sympathy, whenever he is brought in contact with wrong and suffering, 
a tide of sympathy shall flow out from heart to heart, that will finally meliorate the 
condition of our race. at least in ourselves will be a rich reward. by ‘remembering 
those who are in bonds as bound with them,’ our sleep will be none the less sweet, 
our sun will shine none the less pleasantly for it.31 
Just as he did in his earlier journalistic writing, whitman makes use of 
these assertions about the necessity and benefit of “christian sympathy” 
in his poetic work. declaring early on in “song of myself” that “I am 
he attesting sympathy,” whitman’s poetic persona becomes a strong 
advocate for sympathy, asserting that “whoever walks a furlong without 
sympathy walks to his own funeral drest in his shroud” (LGVar., 1:79). 
while he also explicitly agreed that christians had an obligation to 
sympathize with criminals, and, like chapin, attempted to school his 
readers as to the benefits of this interaction for both the objects and 
subjects of sympathy, whitman’s poetic depiction of sympathy does not 
deny the challenges involved in sympathetic identification nor present 
it as an uncomplicated process. In fact he depicts it as a quite difficult 
struggle, perhaps mostly in a psychological sense, that demands strength 
and determination from the sympathizer. 
The section of “song of myself,” running from section 33 through 
38, is perhaps the crucial depiction of the process of sympathetic iden-
tification in his poetry. In section 37 whitman’s persona describes 
himself as “possess’d,” embodying “all presences outlaw’d or suffering,” 
seeing himself “in prison shaped like another man,” and feeling “the 
dull unintermitted pain” (LGVar., 1:59). In just these three lines, we 
have a perfect example of whitman’s portrayal of the complex process 
of sympathetic identification, a process depicted as being composed of 
at least two very different dynamics. whitman’s speaker begins by as-
serting his “possession” by outlaw and suffering others, which seems 
to place the agency with those who have “possessed” him. This “pos-
session” leads to his “embodiment” of their presences. as they have 
claimed control over his body, they will now use him as a medium to 
speak (in a similar sense to his assertion in section 24 that the “voices 
of the interminable generations of prisoners” can be heard “through 
me”). while this initially appears to be exclusively a passive process on 
the speaker’s part, perhaps requiring only a willingness to open himself 
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up to these other presences or voices, the second dynamic requires more 
active participation—an act of imagination—from him. In this dynamic, 
he sees himself “in prison shaped like another man” and feels that man’s 
“dull unintermitted pain.” here, whitman’s speaker can imagine him-
self in the place of imprisoned others and achieves sympathy for them 
by feeling their pain. he expands his description of this process in the 
next few lines, as he “becomes” different convicts or joins them in their 
suffering: “for me the keepers of convicts shoulder their carbines and 
keep watch, / It is I let out in the morning and barr’d at night. // not 
a mutineer walks handcuff’d to jail but I am handcuff’d to him and 
walk by his side, / [ . . .] // not a youngster is taken for larceny but I 
go up too, and am tried and sentenced” (59). The section closes with 
his sympathetic identification with a dying cholera patient (“I also lie 
at the last gasp, / my face is ash-color’d, my sinews gnarl, away from 
me people retreat”) and a beggar (“I project my hat, sit shame-faced, 
and beg”) (59). 
In the 1855 version of “song of myself,” this section begins dif-
ferently with a passage that was deleted from subsequent versions, but 
that can be very useful in developing our understanding of the nature 
of the sympathetic identification occurring at this point in the poem. 
notably, the speaker begins by evoking “o christ!,” suggesting that 
his christianity allows this sympathy to happen, and then describes 
the “fit” that is “mastering” him. This fit allows him to suffer through 
a number of moments of american punishment: “the rebel . . . gaily 
adjusting his throat to the rope-noose,” “the savage at the stump, his 
eye-sockets empty, his mouth spirting whoops and defiance,” and 
“the brooklyn boy . . . look[ing] down the shores of the wallabout 
and remember[ing] the prison ships” (LGVar., 1:58n). In reference to 
these figures, he notes, “These become mine and me every one, and 
they are but little, / I become as much more as I like” (58n). again, the 
speaker asserts that he “becomes” these figures. This is consistent with 
the dynamic guiding the entire section of Leaves of Grass that begins 
in section 33, wherein he identifies with a variety of suffering people, 
including a woman being told of her husband’s death, an accused woman 
burned as a witch, a “hounded slave,” a “mash’d fireman,” and the “four 
hundred and twelve young men” who died in a conflict with mexican 
forces (51-54). he explains his relationship to these figures: “I do not 
ask the wounded person how he feels, I myself become the wounded 
person” (52). It is interesting, though, that in the original opening lines 
of section 37 he characterizes this “becoming” as a “fit” that “masters” 
him, suggesting that he is not in control of it, but that this sympathy is 
something that floods into him because he is receptive to it. 
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The initial invocation of christ in these lines indicates that whit-
man characterized the process of sympathetic identification, as the 
anti-gallows ministers did, as a christian one, as the proper activ-
ity of true followers of christ’s teachings, a characterization that he 
would develop further later in this sequence. yet even with this notion 
that sympathy and christianity are closely associated, the persona of 
“song of myself” resists a whole-hearted embrace of sympathy here. 
The identification of whitman’s persona with “all presences outlaw’d 
or suffering,” of “seeing myself in prison,” leads him to a moment of 
crisis. The feeling of all this pain of others becomes too much for him. 
he begins section 38 proclaiming, “enough! enough! enough! / some-
how I have been stunn’d. stand back! / give me a little time beyond 
my cuff’d head, slumbers, dreams, gaping, / I discover myself on the 
verge of a usual mistake” (LGVar., 1:59-60). numerous readings of 
the poem offer explanations for what is going on here in terms of the 
persona’s experience of sympathy. for instance, stephen black explains 
that “the identification” he has achieved “carries with it the burden of 
the other man’s suffering and pain” (black, 95). and Thomas couser, 
describing the threat that this process poses to the speaker, claims that 
his “unrestrained identification with others has nearly obliterated his 
sense of himself.”32 while the sympathetic persona is likely threatened in 
multiple ways, whitman’s language emphasizes the suffering one takes 
on as one attempts to feel another’s pain (readers might think of eva in 
stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin for a parallel, as she physically weakens when 
the suffering of the slaves “sunk into [her] heart”).33 whitman’s persona 
is “stunn’d,” has his head “cuff’d,” and is left “gaping” because of all 
of the sympathy he has expended. This passage of the suffering sym-
pathetic subjects could serve as a good response to criticism by kristin 
boudreau, who views in this sequence of the poem “whitman’s pleasure 
in sympathy.” as evidence of the pleasure whitman takes in sympathy, 
she cites the line from section 33: “all this I swallow, it tastes good, I 
like it well” (boudreau, 86). If there is pleasure in this sequence, it is 
certainly counterbalanced and even outweighed by the overwhelming 
burden that the sympathetic subject takes on. 
In response to this consequence of sympathy, whitman’s persona 
approaches “the verge of a usual mistake” and begs for distance (“stand 
back!”) and “a little time.” he wishes “[t]hat I could forget the mock-
ers and insults! / That I could forget the trickling tears and the blows 
of the bludgeons and hammers!” (LGVar., 1:60). This “mistake” here 
seems to be the attempt to flee from his previous sympathy, to forget the 
suffering he has seen and felt. some critics of the poem reinforce this 
perception. Joel belson, for example, states that “the mistake of which 
whitman accuses himself is his momentary withdrawal from the relation 
21
of empathy which he has established.” he explains that the mistake is 
“usual” in “the sense that it is common or human.”34 That is, human 
beings tend to resist sympathy if the price, emotionally or spiritually, is 
seen as too high. sholom kahn agrees, asserting that “the ‘mistake’ is 
one of separation, emotional distance and failure of sympathy.”35 In line 
965 of “song of myself,” whitman’s persona wishes “that I could look 
with a separate look on my own crucifixion and bloody crowning” (60). 
This line suggests two different reactions on the part of the persona. 
first, it suggests that he desires to be concerned only with his own suf-
fering rather than anyone else’s (including perhaps christ’s, implying 
an impulse to reject “christian sympathy”). while this wish to ignore 
the suffering of others so that he will not have to feel another’s pain is 
“usual,” in that it is an understandable human response, it is also, as 
whitman notes, a “mistake.” second, that the speaker’s own suffering 
is described in christian terms serves as a reminder that he too should 
be crucified in the way that christ was (that is, he should, like christ, 
be willing to suffer greatly for others). his hesitation to “look on” or 
imagine another’s suffering is what the proponents of sympathy for 
criminals were trying to combat in their pleas to their readers, especially 
their christian readers, to “feel for him, then, as christ would feel” 
and to “restrain not your sympathies” (J. m. m., 160).
It is important then that whitman in this moment of crisis evokes 
the crucifixion of christ, notably the best-known incident of capital 
punishment in western culture. In this passage, wherein critics have 
seen him “deliberately compar[ing] himself with the crucified and 
resurrected christ,” whitman’s persona pales in comparison.36 as he 
prefers to think only about his “own crucifixion” in exclusion of others’ 
suffering, a self-interested move, he implicitly contrasts this feeling of 
self-protection with the motives of christ, which were of self-sacrifice 
and sympathy for everyone else in the world. In christ’s crucifixion, he 
joins the condemned criminals in their suffering, selflessly following 
divine dictate. This comparison provides a corrective model for those 
who would rather ignore the suffering of others, including condemned 
criminals, and the pain they endure. as belson notes, when the poem’s 
persona expresses “his feeling of identification with christ,” it is this 
identification that “marks the moment of the redemption of his spirit, 
of its revitalization” (belson, 64). after this crisis, what kahn labels 
“the most important climax in the poem” (67), the narrator says, “I 
remember now, / I resume the overstaid fraction, / . . . // I troop forth 
replenish’d with supreme power” (LGVar., 1:60). The identification 
with christ is the key to his marching on, to his resisting the impulse 
to withdraw into self-protection, and to continuing his sympathetic 
identification with suffering. 
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The meaning of the “overstaid fraction” has puzzled many critics, 
though a variety of useful readings have been proposed, including James 
miller’s assertion that it is “the complete insight brought by union with 
the Transcendent, . . . by outright identification of self with christ.”37 
betsy erkkila proposes that “it is the ‘overstaid fraction’ of christ as 
a living power existing within himself as part of an eternal present.”38 
These are solid readings of the phrase as it suggests the part (or “frac-
tion”) of christ and his sacrifice that remains (“overstaid”) after the 
crucifixion. In some sense, the idea expressed by whitman here echoes 
the “christ within” each christian that anti-gallows minister samuel 
brimblecom asserted was the source of the sympathy that people of the 
christian faith feel for criminals (22). If we see section 38 of “song 
of myself” as whitman’s dramatization of an individual’s feelings of 
sympathy and resistance to its implications, we should also read this 
section as illustrating the persona’s eventual choice to sympathize, to fol-
low christ’s example, rather than to look only at his “own crucifixion.” 
The consequence is that he avoids the isolation that comes from the 
fearful stance of self-preservation and resistance of sympathy. Instead, 
the persona is now “replenish’d with supreme power, one of an aver-
age unending procession,” with the ability to “pass all boundary lines” 
(LGVar., 1:60). This unity with an “unending procession” parallels 
the potential for progress portrayed by chapin, which begins with the 
individual choice to practice “the great law of love, of Christian sympa-
thy” and then leads all “humanity to rise and shine in the splendor of 
a new day, and the beauty of a new power”(chapin, 89).
for whitman, as for many of the opponents of capital punish-
ment, encouraging sympathy for the criminal was a key element in 
creating a public outcry that would cause legislators to abolish the gal-
lows. much of his writing schools the reader in the need for sympathy 
and even models the process as he identifies sympathetically with the 
actual murderers described in his prose pieces or the imagined ones in 
his poetry. while whitman would not live to see capital punishment 
abolished, he did attribute the reforms in justice that he did see in his 
lifetime to an increased sympathy among the american public. as he 
wrote in 1858, “an increased sensitiveness on the part of the public, 
toward any useless harshness in the treatment of criminals” had been 
created by the advocates against the gallows, which had “diffus[ed] 
more benevolence and sympathy through the public mind, elevating 
the range of temper and feeling, and reacting in a hundred different 
modes, indirectly upon the popular taste, and upon criminal law, the 
doings of courts and Juries, and the management of prisons” (UPP, 
15-16).  while the gallows remained, whitman celebrated the “increased 
sensitiveness,” “benevolence and sympathy through the public mind” 
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as a positive outcome of the reform movement, believing like chapin, 
that increased sympathy is fundamental to all social progress.
as I conclude, I would like to grant merit to stephen black’s pro-
nouncement that “the poet is more pre-occupied with his own sympa-
thies” than he is with the circumstances of those toward whom he is 
sympathetic, whether they be slaves, prostitutes, or convicted murderers 
(black, 93). That is, unlike some of his anti-gallows contemporaries, 
whitman seems to see sympathy as a valuable end in itself, even if it does 
not immediately achieve progressive reforms, including the abolition of 
capital punishment. however, I disagree with black’s implication that it 
is only “his own sympathies” that concern whitman because he certainly 
seems to be modeling the process of sympathy for his readers to follow 
as well. as he noted in “by blue ontario’s shore,” part of his project 
as poet is to “produce great persons,” believing that “the rest follows” 
(LGVar., 1:192). sympathy would definitely be part of the make-up of 
whitman’s conception of “great persons,” as he believes that one can 
only lead a full life if one is open to sympathetic identification. If this is 
the case, whitman would not be alone among the anti-gallows voices 
in his assertion that sympathy might be an end in itself and beneficial 
to the sympathetic. as we saw earlier, e. h. chapin claimed that by 
“cherishing the spirit of christian sympathy, . . . a tide of sympathy 
shall flow out from heart to heart, that will finally meliorate the condi-
tion of our race.” while he does not clarify when this amelioration will 
occur, he does acknowledge the benefit that the sympathizer will feel 
in the meantime by claiming that “at least in ourselves will be a rich 
reward” (89). while whitman would agree that there is “rich reward” 
for the sympathetic subject, he also suggests that progress, including 
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